The Public Trust Doctrine and Sea Level Rise in California: Using the Public Trust to Restrict Coastal Armoring by Angelis, Chloe
Hastings Environmental Law Journal
Volume 19
Number 2 Summer 2013 Article 5
1-1-2013
The Public Trust Doctrine and Sea Level Rise in
California: Using the Public Trust to Restrict
Coastal Armoring
Chloe Angelis
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_environmental_law_journal
Part of the Environmental Law Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Environmental Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Chloe Angelis, The Public Trust Doctrine and Sea Level Rise in California: Using the Public Trust to Restrict Coastal Armoring, 19 Hastings
West Northwest J. of Envtl. L. & Pol'y 249 (2013)
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_environmental_law_journal/vol19/iss2/5
 249 
The Public Trust Doctrine and Sea Level Rise in California: 
Using the Public Trust to Restrict Coastal Armoring 
Chloe Angelis* 
I. INTRODUCTION
II. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
A. The Basics of the Public Trust Doctrine
B. The California Coastal Act as the State’s Recognition and
Codification of the Public Trust
1. Coastal Act Conflict Between Protecting Existing
Structures and Protecting the Natural Coastline
III. FIFTH AMENDMENT TAKINGS
IV. CALIFORNIA SEA LEVEL RISE AND THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
A. The Basics of Rising Ocean Levels in California
B. Seawalls and Coastal Armoring as Options to Protect
Coastline Development
C. The Intersection of Coastal Armoring and the Public Trust
Doctrine
1. Government Violation of the Public Trust Doctrine
2. Private Violation of the Public Trust Doctrine
V. HOW THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE CAN BE USED TO RESTRICT
COASTAL ARMORING ON PRIVATE PROPERTY
A. Overview of Using the Public Trust to Restrict Armoring
Measures Utilized by Littoral Property Holders
1. Case Law Reinforcing that the Coastal Act Provides for
State Enforcement of Public Trust Principles
B. California Water Law and How the Usufructuary Nature of
Water Rights Applies to rights in Public Trust Lands
1. National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County
2. Joslin v. Marin Municipal Water District
C. Takings Case Law and why Prohibitions on Coastal
Armoring Are not Unconstitutional Takings
1. The State’s Authority Under the Public Trust Doctrine
Expands with Evolving Public Needs
2. The Potential Benefits of Protecting Existing Coastal
Development Must be Weighed Against the Adverse
Effects on the Natural Environment and Public Access
* J.D., UC Hastings, College of the Law, 2013; B.A., UC Davis, 2008.
 West  Northwest, Vol. 19, No. 2, Summer 2013 
250 
VI. STATE REGULATION OF COASTAL PROPERTY RIGHTS TO PROTECT
PUBLIC TRUST INTERESTS IN THE SHORELINE IS NOT AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING
VII. CONCLUSION
I. Introduction
California will likely see a 16-inch sea level rise by 2050 and a 55-inch
level rise by the end of the century.1  In the Bay Area alone, 213,000 acres 
will be vulnerable to flooding by year 2100.2  Those 213,000 acres include 
major airports, ports, roads and residential neighborhoods.3  The Public 
Trust Doctrine holds that navigable waters and tidal lands are the property 
of the state, and must be protected and kept accessible for the general 
public.  On the California coast, the line between private lots and public 
land is drawn along the mean high tide line—and as the Pacific Ocean rises, 
that line will encroach on land that is currently held privately.   
What happens when this movement occurs?  Do littoral landholders 
lose property or does the public?  And when the State attempts to 
implement regional sea level rise mitigation plans, can it forbid individuals 
from building seawalls to protect their homes when those seawalls 
contradict regional plans?  Or require them to abandon their lots as part of a 
strategy of managed retreat and wetlands restoration?  If the State so 
significantly restricts what a landowner can do, or not do, to protect their 
property, do such regulations constitute takings under the Fifth 
Amendment?   
Because the California State Legislature has yet to adopt new 
regulations to guide sea level rise adaption, the California Coastal 
Commission is left modifying or adapting existing regulatory mechanisms in 
its effort to address and mitigate the effects sea level rise.4  The Commission 
currently uses its standing authority to require setbacks on new 
developments and to apply assumption of risk clauses to new development 
1. S.F. PLANNING AND URBAN RESEARCH ASS’N [hereinafter SPUR], SPUR Report:
Climate Change Hits Home 9 (2011), available at http://www.spur.org/publications/ 
library/report/climate-change-hits-home. 
2. S.F. BAY CONSERVATION AND DEV. COMM’N [hereinafter BCDC], LIVING WITH A
RISING BAY: VULNERABILITY AND ADAPTATION IN S.F. BAY AND ON ITS SHORELINE, 26 (2011), 
available at http://www.bcdc.ca.gov/BPA/LivingWithRisingBay.pdf. 
3. Id. at 2-4.
4. CAL. COASTAL COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF SEA LEVEL RISE AND SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR
COASTAL CALIFORNIA: 25 (2001), available at http://www.coastal.ca.gov/climate/ 
SeaLevelRise2001.pdf. 
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permits that prohibit the future construction of seawalls.5  The problem is 
that the Commission’s ability to restrict seawall construction on the part of 
existing permit-holders whose permits do not include assumption of risk 
clauses is less clear.  This is where the Public Trust Doctrine comes into 
play. 
In this note I explore the interplay between the Public Trust Doctrine 
and the encroachment of the Pacific Ocean onto privately held coastal 
property in California.  I will attempt to synthesize the Public Trust Doctrine, 
Fifth Amendment takings, implications of sea level rise in California, and 
explain how the Public Trust can be used to justify the drastic measures the 
State will be forced to take to deal with those implications.  Lastly, I will 
show that because the Public Trust Doctrine holds that the State must 
protect the coastline for and make it available and accessible to the general 
public, the State can utilize the doctrine to prevent private property owners 
from arming the coast to protect their land from sea level rise without those 
regulations succumbing to takings claims.  
II. The Public Trust Doctrine
A. The Basics of the Public Trust Doctrine
“By the law of nature these things are common to all mankind, the air, 
running water, the sea and consequently the shores of the sea.”6  In 
America’s early years as a nation, the states adopted this ancient Roman 
doctrine as part of their own common law.7  Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. State 
of Illinois,8 is the fundamental U.S. Public Trust case.  There the Supreme 
Court upheld the revocation of a grant of most of Chicago’s lakefront to the 
Illinois Central Railroad Co.9 on the grounds that Public Trust lands cannot 
be transferred entirely outside the control of the state.10  The Court 
explained that: 
It is the settled law of this country that the ownership of and 
dominion and sovereignty over lands covered by tide waters, 
within the limits of the several states, belong to the respective 
states within which they are found, with the consequent right to 
use or dispose of any portion thereof, when that can be done 
5. Id.
6. David Takacs, The Public Trust Doctrine, Environmental Human Rights, and the
Future of Private Property, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 711, 713 (2008), quoting Justinian. 
7. Id. at 713.
8. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
9. Illinois Central at 462.
10. Id. at 454.
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without substantial impairment of the interest of the public in 
the waters, and subject always to the paramount right of 
congress to control their navigation so far as may be necessary 
for the regulation of commerce with foreign nations and among 
the states.11 
With Illinois Central, the Supreme Court established that tidal lands are the 
property of the  
State in which they lie, and that those lands can only be transferred 
out of state hands when such a transfer is not adverse to the public interest 
in those lands and waters.   
In California, the legislature codified the Public Trust principles upheld 
in Illinois Central with the passage of Article X, section 4 of the California 
Constitution.  The Article holds: 
No individual, partnership, or corporation, claiming or 
possessing the frontage or tidal lands of a harbor, bay, inlet, 
estuary, or other navigable water in this State, shall be permitted 
to exclude the right of way to such water whenever it is required 
for any public purpose, nor to destroy or obstruct the free 
navigation of such water; and the Legislature shall enact such 
laws as will give the most liberal construction to this provision, 
so that access to the navigable waters of this State shall always 
be attainable for the people thereof.12 
Article X, section 4 statutorily protects the coast for the public.  It precludes 
landholders from developing so as to exclude the general public from the 
use of navigable waters and tidal lands. 
In 1970, then University of Michigan law professor Joseph Sax revived 
the use of the Public Trust Doctrine in environmental litigation with his 
article The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial 
Intervention.13  Sax wrote that “certain interests are so particularly the gifts of 
nature’s bounty that they ought to be reserved for the whole of the 
populace.”14  He further wrote that public accessibility to those interests is 
what distinguishes society “as one of citizens rather than of serfs,” and that 
no privileged minority of the population can be permitted to maintain 
exclusive control of those interests.15  In considering Sax’s take on the Public 
11. Id. at 435.
12. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 4.
13. 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
14. Id. at 484.
15. Takacs, supra note 6, at 716 (discussing Sax, supra note 13).
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Trust Doctrine, Professor David Takacs explained that “Sax is concerned 
with . . .  ‘a diffuse majority [being] made subject to the will of a concerted 
minority.’  That ‘concerted minority’ is private property owners whose private 
economic interests lead them to arrogate ecological resources, which, by 
right, belong to the public.”16  
As Illinois Central, Sax, and Takacs emphasize, private rights held in 
coastal Public Trust land are not as sacredly protected as traditional real 
property rights.  Instead they are usufructuary, existing only relative to the 
rights of others.  Takacs contends that Public Trust property rights are like 
water rights in that they are regulated and subject to limitation or 
revocation.17  In the case of California’s coast therefore, owners of beachfront 
lots do not have unrestricted leeway to build seawalls or otherwise arm the 
coast to protect their individual parcels.  The Public Trust provides for the 
protection and preservation of coastal lands in their natural state for public 
use; and even where Trust lands are privately owned, such ownership rights 
are subordinate to Trust interests.  An owner of beachfront land therefore, 
may not build a seawall or other armoring structure that will negatively alter 
beaches and undermine the public’s right to enjoy and access those beaches 
under the Public Trust Doctrine. 
B. The California Coastal Act as the State’s Recognition
and Codification of the Public Trust
The California Legislature passed the Coastal Act in 1976,18 codifying 
five basic policy objectives that include preserving coastal ecosystems and 
ensuring public access to the shoreline.19  Although voters established the 
California Coastal Commission by initiative in 1972, the Coastal Act (“Act”) 
made the Commission permanent20 and charged it with “protecting and 
enhancing coastal resources, ensuring balanced resource use, maximizing 
public access, ensuring priority of coastal-dependent uses, and encouraging 
coordinated planning.”21  The Coastal Commission maintains jurisdiction 
over the coastal zone, an area designated by the legislature that extends 
from three miles into the ocean to between a few hundred feet to five miles 
16. Id. at 716 (quoting Sax, supra note 13).
17. Id. at 721.
18. Program Overview, California Coastal Cmm’n, http://www.coastal.ca.
gov/whoweare.html (Last visited Nov. 17, 2011). 
19. Meg Caldwell & Craig H. Segall, No Day at the Beach: Sea Level Rise, Ecosystem
Loss, and Public Access Along the California Coast, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 533, 544 (2007). 
20. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, supra note 18.
21. Caldwell & Segall, supra note 19, at 544.
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inland.22  All development within this zone must comply with a permit from 
either the Coastal Commission (or the Bay Conservation and Development 
Commission (“BCDC”) in the San Francisco Bay) or a local government 
acting under a Commission-certified Local Coastal Program.23  The 
Commission’s issuance and denial of development permits, as prescribed by 
the Act, must be in accordance with the Commission’s stated policy goals—
to protect the coastal environment, to assure “balanced utilization and 
conservation of coastal zone resources [and to] . . . maximize public access 
to and along the coast.”24 
Not only does the Coastal Act broadly call for protection of the coastal 
zone and public accessibility to it, provisions throughout the Act explicitly 
enforce Public Trust principles.  Section 30001.5 is one of these 
provisionsthe basic goals of state management of the coastal zone are to 
“[m]aximize public access to and along the coast and maximize public 
recreational opportunities in the coastal zone . . . .”25  This provision is a 
straightforward recognition of the State’s intent to uphold the Public Trust 
by ensuring that the shoreline is available for public use and enjoyment. 
Section 30609.5 is also particularly illustrative of the Act’s recognition 
of the Public Trust Doctrine: 
[N]o state land that is located between the first public road and
the sea . . . shall be transferred or sold by the state to any private
entity unless the state retains a permanent property interest in the land
adequate to provide public access to or along the sea.  In any transfer or
sale of real property by a state agency to a private entity or
person pursuant to this section, the instrument of conveyance
created by the state shall require that the private entity or person
or the entity or person’s successors or assigns manage the
property in such a way as to ensure that existing or potential
public access is not diminished.  The instrument of conveyance
shall further require that any violation of this management requirement
shall result in the reversion of the real property to the state.26
This section codifies the Public Trust principle that the State holds the 
coastline in trust for the public.27  It asserts that in instances where land is 
transferred into private hands the State retains an interest in the property so 
22. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, supra note 18.
23. Id.
24. CAL. COASTAL ACT, § 30001.5 (West 2012).
25. CAL. COASTAL ACT, § 30001.5(c).
26. Id. at § 30609.5(a) (emphasis added).
27. Id. at § 30609.5
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as to assure public access to the shoreline.28  In its final clause, section 
30609.5(a) states that if a property owner who has agreed to provide for 
public beach access fails to do so, the property in question will revert to the 
State.29  By providing for reversion of private property into the State’s hands 
when a property owner violates Trust principles, the legislature 
demonstrated that it holds Public Trust principles in the highest regard, and 
that not even private littoral landowners have the leeway to infringe on 
those principles.  
The overall goals of the Coastal Act and sections30 including 30001.5 
and 30609.5, make clear that the State considers protection and preservation 
of, and public accessibility to the coast priorities of coastal management. 
Furthermore, in codifying these Trust values, the Coastal Act provides 
grounds for enforcing those principles apart from and independent of the 
Public Trust Doctrine common law.  Additionally, the limited California case 
law on this topic reinforces the Coastal Commission’s power under the 
Coastal Act to limit private property rights in accordance with Trust 
priorities of access and preservation. 
1. Coastal Act Conflict Between Protecting Existing
Structures and  Protecting the Natural Coastline
While Coastal Act sections 30001.5 and 30609.5 demand that the 
Commission prioritize coastal access and shoreline protection, property 
owners contend that section 30235 guarantees shoreline armoring when a 
home faces imminent danger.31  Section 30235 states: 
Revetments, breakwaters, groins, harbor channels, seawalls, cliff 
retaining walls, and other such construction that alters natural 
shoreline processes shall be permitted when required to serve 
coastal-dependent uses or to protect existing structures or public 
beaches in danger from erosion and when designed to eliminate 
or mitigate adverse impacts on local shoreline sand supply 
(emphasis added) . . . .32 
28. Id. at § 30609.5(c)
29. Id.
30. Sections 30210, 30211 and 30212 all also explicitly seek to ensure that
public access to the shore remains the highest priority of California coastal 
development.   
31. Todd T. Cardiff, Conflict in the California Coastal Act: Sand and Seawalls, 38 CAL.
W. L. REV. 255, 257 (Fall 2001).
32. CAL. COASTAL ACT § 30235.
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This section pitches the Act’s overarching goals of coastal preservation and 
access against section 30235’s specific mandate to protect existing 
structures.  However, the meaning of “existing structures” is a source of 
debatesome contend that the phrase refers to any standing structure, 
regardless of when it was built, while others argue that “existing” applies 
only to development completed prior to when the Coastal Act became 
effective.33 
The legislative history of the Act, and its undeniable conservationist 
overtones, support the position that the legislature intended section 30235 
to only protect structures in existence prior to the enactment of the Coastal 
Act in 1976.34  Analysis of section 30235’s legislative history reveals the fact 
that the word “existing” was not present in earlier versions of the Act but was 
included in the final version in order to distinguish between structures 
existing prior to the Act’s passage and those that would be constructed in 
the future.35  Additionally, section 30253(b)which prohibits new 
development from “contribut[ing] significantly to erosion, geologic 
instability, or destruction of the site or surrounding area or in any way 
require the construction of protective devices . . .” 36would be superfluous 
if  “existing” in section 30235 did not distinguish between pre-Coastal Act 
and post-Coastal Act development. 
If section 30235 requires seawall protection of structures no matter 
when the structures were built, then the requirements of 30253(b) are 
effectively meaningless.37  Section 30253(b) prohibits new structures from 
being built in places where they will require the construction of protective 
devices such as seawalls.  Section 30235 requires the Commission to permit 
protective devices to protect “existing structures.”  If “existing structures” in 
30235 referred to both pre and post Coastal Act development, then section 
30253(b)’s requirement that new development be set far back enough to not 
require shoreline protection in the future would be without purpose. 
Therefore, the most logical interpretation of these two sections is that 30235 
requires the Commission to permit seawalls when necessary to protect pre-
Coastal Act development, and 30253(b) requires that all development 
constructed since the Act’s passage be set far back enough from the coast so 
as not to require shoreline armoring in the future. 
This conclusion drawn from the legislative history and textual analysis 
of sections 30235 and 30253; coupled with the overall environmentalist tone 
33. Surfrider Found. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 2006 WL 1530224 at 2 (Cal. Ct.
App. June 5, 2006). 
34. Cardiff, supra note 31, at 262-63.
35. Id. at 267.
36. CAL. COASTAL ACT § 30253(b).
37. Cardiff, supra note 31, at 269.
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of the Coastal Act and sections 30001.5 and 30609.5, which prioritize coastal 
preservation; are further evidence of the legislative intent that the Act be 
used primarily to preserve the natural shoreline and ensure public 
accessibility to it.  And, as I discuss throughout the remainder of this paper, 
the Public Trust Doctrine, which both reinforces and is reinforced by the 
Coastal Act, requires above all else, the State protect the coastline for public 
use. 
III. Fifth Amendment Takings
The final clause of the Fifth Amendment holds: “nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”38  The takings 
provision does not prevent the government from claiming private property 
for public use.  Instead it requires the government to compensate an owner 
for property when State action or regulation is found to be a taking that 
wholly deprives property of its value.  The takings doctrine pertains to the 
discussion of sea level rise and coastal armoring in that if a private property 
owner is prohibited from arming their land from rising oceans, those owners 
are likely to claim that the prohibition against seawall construction is a 
regulatory taking.  
 A regulatory taking differs from a physical taking in that it occurs 
when the government regulates so as to render a landowner’s property 
valueless.  In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,39 the Supreme Court 
considered the constitutionality of the Beachfront Management Act; which 
effectively barred Lucas from building homes on his two beachfront 
parcels.40  Lucas argued that the ban imposed by the Beachfront 
Management Act was a regulatory takingthe Court agreed.41  The opinion 
in Lucas explains that there are two kinds of takingsthose in which there is 
a physical invasion of private property and those in which a regulation 
“denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land.”42  The Court 
writes that the second category, regulatory takings, is justified on the 
grounds that a regulation denying all economically beneficial use of land “is, 
from the landowner’s point of view, the equivalent of a physical 
appropriation.”43  However, where the “State ‘reasonably concludes that ‘the 
health, safety, morals, or general welfare’ [of the public] would be promoted 
by prohibiting particular contemplated uses of land,’ compensation need 
38. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
39. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
40. Lucas at 1007.
41. Id. at 1009.
42. Id. at 1015.
43. Id. at 1017.
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not accompany prohibition.”44  In this particular case, the Court found that 
the Beachfront Management Act did deny Lucas all economically beneficial 
use of his land, and was therefore an unconstitutional taking.45   
The paramount takings case is Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of 
New York.46   
The Court there explained that the “Fifth Amendment’s guarantee . . . 
[is] designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear 
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the 
public as a whole.”47  This proclamation holds that when the government 
“takes” private property to accomplish a greater public good (such as 
construct a highway, remake a blighted neighborhood, etc.), the owner of 
the taken property cannot be forced to alone bear the cost of losing property 
that will go to benefit the general public.  However, the takings clause does 
not imply that the general public must bear the burdens of a select few. 
While the takings doctrine prohibits an individual property owner from 
bearing the costs of the general public, the doctrine does not support the 
inverse theory.  That is, it does not hold that the public must pay the costs of 
protecting the interests of a select few. 
With Penn Central the Supreme Court found that there is no clear test 
for determining when government action effectuates a taking.  Instead, the 
Court held that takings analyses are based on a three-factor ad hoc 
evaluation of the particular set of circumstances.48  This ad hoc evaluation 
consists of the following elements: (1) the economic impact of the 
regulation; (2) the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct, 
investment-backed expectations; and (3) the character of the action (e.g., 
whether the action is a physical invasion, or whether it affects a single 
property owner or property owners generally).49   
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission50 is another seminal takings case. 
There the Supreme Court found that the Coastal Commission’s grant of a 
building permit conditioned upon a public easement to cross the plaintiff’s 
beachfront property was an unconstitutional taking.51  The Court added to 
the standard takings analysis here in holding that there must be a 
substantial nexus between a permit condition imposed and the justification 
44. Id. at 1014 (citing Penn Cent. Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104 (1978)). 
45. Id. at 1031-32.
46. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
47. Id. at 123 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
48. Penn Central at 124.
49. Id. at 124, 134.
50. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
51. Id. at 841-42.
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for such a condition.52  The Court found in this situation that the required 
nexus did not exist.  It held that the Coastal Commission required the 
easement across Nollan’s property because the proposed development 
would block the public’s view of the beach, but that an easement across the 
property did not actually solve the problem of houses blocking visual access 
to the beach from the road.53  
Seven years after Nollan, the Supreme Court again added an element to 
the takings analysis.  In Dolan v. City of Tigard,54 the Court held that there must 
be “rough proportionality” between the condition placed on a permit and 
the reason for the imposition of the condition.55  The Court explained that 
“[n]o precise mathematical calculation is required, but [one] must make 
some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is 
related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed 
development.”56  In this instance the Court found that, while requiring a 
greenway for flood control was a valid condition on the plaintiff’s building 
permit, requiring such a greenway to be made available for public use was 
not roughly proportional to flood control.57 
According to Penn Central, finding an unconstitutional taking requires 
that a government action has a severe economic impact, interferes with the 
property owner’s distinct investment backed expectations, and has a 
discriminatory character.  Lucas further requires that, for an action to be a 
regulatory taking, the regulation in question must deny an owner all 
economic use of their land and not be in furtherance of the general welfare. 
Additionally, if the takings analysis involves conditions placed on building 
permits, Nollan and Dolan require such a condition to be substantially related 
and roughly proportional to the goal sought to be achieved by the condition. 
In addition to informing the analysis due a takings claim, these cases 
illuminate the ever-present struggle between protection of private property 
rights, environmental land management, and the greater public good.  The 
American legal system is based on a deep-seeded regard for private 
property; yet in this day and age, where open land is increasingly less 
plentiful, the greater public good is often sacrificed to the exercise of a 
single landholder’s own property interests.  Lucas, Penn Central, Nollan, and 
Dolan all face these conflicting interests, and while the Court’s opinions in 
these cases reveal a willingness to cut into private property rights under very 
particular circumstances, it exhibits a strong proclivity towards protecting 
52. Id. at 837.
53. Id. at 838-39.
54. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
55. Id. at 391.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 393-94.
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against such intrusions.  That hesitancy means that private property owners 
will often have the upper hand when it comes to litigating seawall 
prohibitions.   
IV. California Sea Level Rise and the Public Trust
A. The Basics of Rising Ocean Levels in California
Ocean levels are rising globally because of thermal expansion and 
melting glaciers and ice sheets.58  As the temperature on earth increases, the 
ocean retains more land-generated and atmospheric heat and thereby 
expands up onto shore.59  The oceans’ absorption of melted ice coming off of 
land-based glaciers and ice sheets, particularly those that have historically 
occupied extensive areas of Greenland and Antarctica, are also contributing 
to rising sea levels.60  This combination of heat absorption and melting land-
based ice is predicted to cause a 16-inch increase in ocean levels by 2050 
and a 55-inch increase by 2100.61 
The 2007 climate change report published by the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) explains that while oceans have 
experienced yearly rises since the end of the ice age, the rate has increased 
in the last two decades.62  Twentieth century estimates show that sea levels 
typically rose at a rate of around 1.7 mm yr–1; but satellite data and coastal 
gauge information collected between 1993 and 2003 demonstrate that sea 
level rise has accelerated to an average of 3 mm yr–1.63  Furthermore, the IPCC 
estimates under certain emissions scenarios, the rate of sea level rise could 
increase to 4 mm yr–1.64 
According to a 2011 report published by BCDC, 180,000 acres of San 
Francisco Bay shoreline will be vulnerable to flooding by 2050, and another 
33,000 acres will be vulnerable by the end of the century.65  As the BCDC 
report explains, the 180,000 Bay Area acres correspond to the 100-year 
floodplain,66 and are most likely to see sea-level-rise-related flooding with 
58. SPUR, supra note 1, at 9.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. IPCC FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT: CLIMATE CHANGE 2007, WORKING GROUP I: 
THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg1/en/faq-
5-1.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2012).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. BCDC, supra note 2, at 45.
66. Id. at 26.
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extreme storm eventswhich could become more likely as global 
temperature increases and whether patterns change.67  Along with airports, 
businesses, ports, roads, and railroads, the 100-year floodplain in the Bay 
Area alone includes 66,000 acres of residential development.68  A football 
field is about one acre; so an area of Bay Area land equivalent to about 
213,000 football fields could be under water in a major storm event by year 
2100the entire California coast will face a similar situation.  
B. Seawalls and Coastal Armoring as Options to Protect
Coastline Development
Along California’s over 2,000 miles of tidal coastline (including bays 
and inlets) around 1,100 miles of new or modified seawalls or other 
protection structures would be needed to protect development from 
flooding.69  A May 2009 report from the California Climate Change Center 
estimates that building or upgrading 1,100 miles of seawalls would cost $14 
billion in year 2000 dollars, and that those structures would then require 
$1.4 billion (in year 2000 dollars) a year in maintenance.70   
Not only are structures designed to arm the coast incredibly cost-
prohibitive on as large a scale as considered here, they are also incredibly 
environmentally detrimental.  Coastal armoring structures include seawalls, 
revetments, and bulkheads.71  “Seawalls are designed to resist the forces of 
storm waves; bulkheads are to retain the fill; and revetments are to protect 
the shoreline against the erosion associated with light waves.”72  Each of 
these structures designed to protect coastal development fix the position of 
the coastline.73  This fixation results in a loss of beach due both to the 
footprint of the structure itself and to passive erosiona process in which 
the beach drowns because the armoring structure prevents the rising ocean 
from moving inland and creating new beach.74  
Imagine that a city, in an effort to protect a coastal road, builds a wall 
on the beach along the coastal roadway.  With the construction of the wall 
the public has already lost a few feet of usable beach to the footprint of the 
67. Id. at 45.
68. Id. at 48.
69. MATTHEW HEBERGER, HEATHER COOLEY, PABLO HERRERA, PETER H. GLEICK & ELI
MOORE, CAL. CLIMATE CHANGE CENTER, THE IMPACTS OF SEA LEVEL RISE ON THE CALIFORNIA
COAST 3 (2009).  
70. Id. at 3.
71. Id. at 34.
72. Id.
73. HEBERGER ET AL., supra note 69, at 34.
74. Id.
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structure.  Now picture an extreme winter storm season with waves coming 
further inland than in the past due to higher than normal sea levels.  On an 
unaltered beach, this intense wave activity would push sand further inland, 
essentially pushing the entire beach further inland.  However, where there is 
a seawall, this inland movement of the beach is stopped short.  Instead of 
waves pushing the beach inland, the movement is frozen at the seawall.  As 
the ocean continues to rise up against the wall, it drowns the sandy beach, 
prohibited from inland migration by the wall.  
Less expensive and environmentally detrimental options are to either 
bolster beaches with foliage or other nourishment or to implement plans of 
managed coastline retreat and let nature take its course.75  Beach 
nourishment is a process in which sand is brought in and added to a 
drowning beach to restore dry sand beach and act as a buffer between 
seaside development and the ocean.  Managed retreat involves abandoning 
vulnerable coastal development and infrastructure or moving those 
structures further inland.  The logic behind managed retreat is that because 
coastal armoring damages the natural coastal environment, and because 
such structures are not economically feasible on a massive scale, some 
coastal development will need to be sacrificed in order to allow for the 
natural advancement of the shoreline.76 
C. The Intersection of Coastal Armoring and the Public
Trust Doctrine
1. Government Violation of the Public Trust Doctrine
If the State decided to address sea level rise by armoring the 1,100 
miles of coast that would need armoring, the Coastal Commission and the 
local and federal agencies with jurisdiction throughout the state’s coastal 
zone would oversee such a plan.  However, in our already debt-ridden state, 
executing a fourteen billion dollar coastal armoring plan is impractical and 
unrealistic.  Furthermore, the Public Trust Doctrine and the Coastal Act’s 
reinforcement of it prohibit the State from doing or allowing anything that 
would destroy or eliminate public access to the shoreand large scale 
coastal armoring would do just that.  
Clearly a government sea level rise adaptation strategy involving the 
widespread construction of seawalls is problematic.  However, it must be 
conceded that the State’s failure to build coastal protective structures would 
75. Associated Press, Economists Say Sea Level Rise would Be Costly, CBSNEWS (Sep.
14, 2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-501369_162-20106389.html.  
76. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., OCEAN AND
COASTAL RES. MGMT., http://coastalmanagement.noaa.gov/initiatives/shoreline_ ppr_ 
retreat.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2011). 
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result in adverse consequences as well.  Where protective structures are not 
built, coastal property will be vulnerable to flooding, and as the ocean rises 
that vulnerable property is going to face damage or destruction.  Even lands 
the Public Trust currently serves to protect could be lost to unimpeded 
rising seas (though note that as the mean high tide line migrates inland, so 
too do lands protected by the Public Trust).  Property damage is not 
something to take lightly; but as discussed, a 1,100-mile seawall is simply 
not a feasible or acceptable solution.  
2. Private Violation of the Public Trust Doctrine
While the Public Trust and the Coastal Act prohibit the Coastal 
Commission and local governments from constructing seawalls up and 
down the coast to the detriment of the state’s beaches and public access to 
those beaches, whether or not those prohibitions apply to private actors is 
somewhat less clear.  On the face of the issue, one would assume that a 
private property owner has a right to protect his home from flood damage, 
and that such a right to protect one’s property includes building a seawall to 
protect the property from flooding.  However, there are several issues with a 
littoral landowner building a seawall to arm his land against sea level rise, 
even if that wall is entirely within the limits of that landowner’s lot: such 
walls may divert wave energy so as to more seriously accelerate the erosion 
of neighboring lots,77, 78 may conflict with a state-wide sea level rise 
adaptation plan, and will most certainly damage Public Trust interests in the 
beaches on which such walls are constructed.   
Herein lies the tension to be explored in the remainder of this paper: 
how do we square private property rights, and a landowner’s right to protect 
their property from flooding, with the Public Trust and the State’s obligation 
to protect the shoreline environment and maintain public access to it. 
77. Monterey Bay Nat’l Marine Sanctuary, MBNMS RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
ISSUES: COASTAL ARMORING, http://montereybay.noaa.gov/resourcepro/resmanissues/ 
coastal.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2012). 
78. In addition to constituting Public Trust violations against the general
public, a littoral landowner’s construction of a seawall is also a Public Trust 
violation, a nuisance, and an infringement of property rights against the seawall 
builder’s neighbors.  This however, is another issue to be explored in another paper. 
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V. How the Public Trust Doctrine Can be Used to Restrict
Coastal Armoring on Private Property
A. Overview of Using the Public Trust to Restrict Armoring
Measures Utilized by Littoral Property Holders
As discussed above, large-scale coastal armoring along the California 
shoreline is cost prohibitive, environmentally detrimental, and a violation of 
Public Trust principles.  On the other hand, private property rights are 
among the most fundamental rights recognized and adamantly protected in 
the United States.  One can only expect that as sea level rise becomes more 
imminent and threatening, property owners are going to do whatever they 
can to protect their coastal homes.  And one of the actions those property 
owners are likely to take is to build seawalls and otherwise arm their coastal 
lots.  Even if such structures are built entirely within the limits of one’s 
private property, their effects, especially when multiplied by a large number 
of landholders, are Public Trust violations. 
In California, the Coastal Act mandates that development activities, 
which include “construction of buildings, divisions of land, and activities 
that change the intensity of use of land or public access to coastal waters,” 
must comply with a coastal development permit.79  According to the Coastal 
Act, those seeking to develop must obtain a permit from either the local 
government or the California Coastal Commission,80 or BCDC in the Bay 
Area.  As discussed earlier in the paper, the Coastal Commission is 
obligated to issue or deny permits in accordance with the Public Trust 
principles codified in the Coastal Actincluding preservation of the natural 
shoreline for public use and enjoyment.  
As sea level rise related flood events become more likely, one can 
expect the Coastal Commission to begin working with local governments to 
develop both regional and statewide adaptation and protection plans.  At 
the same time, private property owners are going to begin armoring the 
coast along their lots in an effort to protect their homes.  When the Coastal 
Commission either denies such coastal armoring permits, or brings 
enforcement actions against those who build without permits in violation of 
the Coastal Act, landowners are likely to bring takings claims against the 
State.   
Perhaps unfortunately for those property owners, Public Trust 
principles, as codified by the Coastal Act, the California Constitution, and 
ascribed to by case law, vest in the State the authority to deny permits for 
destructive armoring structures in the name of environmental protection 
and coastal accessibility.  
79. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, supra note 18.
80. Id.
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1. Case Law Reinforcing that the Coastal Act Provides for
State  Enforcement of Public Trust Principles
Since the Coastal Act was passed in 1976, California courts have 
continually recognized that the Act broadly serves to ensure public access to 
the state’s beaches and that the State can restrict littoral property rights 
under the Coastal Act in furtherance of that prescribed public access.  In Sea 
Ranch Association v. California Coastal Commission81 a California court held that 
“[m]aximum access is to be provided and developments [are] not to 
interfere with the public’s right to access to the sea.”82  The opinion then 
stated that “public access and aesthetic considerations constitute areas that 
legitimately fall within the Commission’s regulatory power.”83  In other 
words, the court in Sea Ranch recognized that advancing Public Trust 
interests, including those interests in public access to and aesthetic 
enjoyment of the coast, are within the Coastal Commission’s statutorily 
bestowed authority. 
In addition to the Coastal Act’s broad directive to ensure public beach 
access, several provisions in the Act specifically serve to uphold and make 
enforceable Public Trust principles; and those provisions create statutory 
grounds upon which the State can restrict a private property owner’s 
claimed right to arm their coastal property despite the environmental effects 
such armoring has.  Case law addressing the topic of coastal armoring 
further reinforces the State’s authority.  In Whaler’s Village v. California Coastal 
Commission,84 the California Court of Appeals addressed a dispute over 
whether the Commission had the authority to place certain conditions on an 
after-the-fact development permit allowing the homeowners of Whaler’s 
Village in Ventura to keep a rock revetment constructed to protect their 
homes from wave activity during a heavy storm season.85  The permit 
conditions included an unconditional waiver of any liability on the part of 
the Commission for any future erosion damage and a dedication of a public 
easement along the beach fronting the Whaler’s Village properties.86  
The court agreed with the Coastal Commission’s argument that “a 
fundamental right to protect one’s property under the Constitution is not 
the equivalent of a vested right to protect property in a particular manner . . . 
.”87  The court further stated:  
81. 527 F. Supp. 390 (1981) (vacated because of mootness).
82. Id. at 392.
83. Id. at 393.
84. 173 Cal. App. 3d 240 (1985).
85. Id. at 249.
86. Id. at 248.
87. Id. at 252-53.
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[P]roperty ownership rights, reserved to the individual by
constitutional provision, must be subordinated to the rights of
society.  It is now a fundamental axiom in the law that one may
not do with his property as he pleases; his use is subject to
reasonable restraints to avoid societal detriment . . . .88  
This proclamation, and the Whaler’s opinion generally, serves as an example 
of the court’s willingness to uphold the Coastal Commission’s power to 
restrict littoral property rights, based on its power under the Coastal Act to 
do so, in order to preserve public access to the state’s beaches in 
accordance with the Public Trust.  
Furthermore, Whaler’s Village demonstrates the court’s broad 
acceptance of the principle that property rights do not entitle a landowner to 
unbounded development rightsas the court there held, such rights are 
subject to “reasonable restraints.”89  Of course the meaning of the word 
“reasonable” in legal contexts is a never-ending source of debate.  The 
beach-going public may think that it is quite reasonable to prohibit seawall 
construction where construction will eventually cause the elimination of a 
favorite beach.  On the other hand, the homeowners seeking approval of a 
seawall necessary to save their home from flooding or erosion will quite 
certainly find prohibition of the seawall on the basis of beach preservation 
entirely unreasonable.  However, one cannot deny that protecting a beach 
provides the most benefit to the most peoplethe entire public can enjoy a 
beautiful beach, but only a single homeowner (and perhaps his friends and 
family) benefits from a single beachfront house. 
B. California Water Law and How the Usufructuary Nature
of Water Rights Applies to Rights in Public Trust Lands
1. National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County
National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County,90 a case 
regarding the City of Los Angeles’s appropriation of water from the 
tributaries of Mono Lake, represents a drastic shift in the court’s 
understanding and use of the Public Trust Doctrine.  Mono Lake, like the 
California Coast, is an ecological and scenic asset.91  The lake is filled with 
freshwater from mountain streams, and because there are no outlets it 
88. Id. at 253 (quoting People v. Byers, 90 Cal. App. 3d 140, 147-48 (1979)).
89. 173 Cal. App. 3d at 253.
90. 33 Cal. 3d 419 (1983).
91. Id. at 425.
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maintains a delicate salt, saline, and alkaline balance.92  The Los Angeles 
Department of Water and Power (“DWP”) received permission in 1940 from 
the California State Water Resources Control Board to divert water from the 
streams and creeks that feed Mono Lake.93  At the time the plaintiffs brought 
suit, DWP’s diversions had caused a severe drop in the lake’s surface area 
and volume, the transformation of an island seagull rookery into an easily 
accessible and unprotected peninsula, and general destruction of the 
ecosystem.94   
Recognizing that the Public Trust, aside from ensuring navigability and 
public access, serves to protect the ecological and aesthetic benefits of Trust 
lands, the court found that the Public Trust was a sound basis on which to 
restrict DWP’s appropriations of water from the Mono Lake tributaries.95  The 
California Supreme Court here held that regardless of DWP’s existing 
appropriative water rights, the State was obligated under the Public Trust to 
protect the lake as far as feasible.96  Furthermore, the court wrote that the 
State has authority to reevaluate existing allocations of water even where 
those allocations were originally granted in consideration of and despite 
their effect on the Public Trust.97 
While California water rights have never enjoyed the same level of 
absoluteness typically attributed to rights in land, the court’s logic in all but 
revoking DWP’s water rights based on the damage the exercise of those 
rights imposed on Trust resources applies to littoral property rights as well. 
In Audubon the court understood that allowing DWP to continue diverting as 
much water as it was would result in total, irreparable destruction of the 
Mono Lake ecosystem; and because the lake is protected by the Public Trust, 
that destruction was in violation of the principles of the doctrine.  In 
accordance with the Public Trust, the court was forced to take drastic 
actiontemporarily revoking DWP’s water rights—in order to halt and 
reverse the lake’s decline.   
The Mono Lake case was one in which an ecological emergency called 
for a drastic legal response.  If the court had not limited DWP’s diversions, 
Mono Lake, and the unique ecosystem it supported, would have been lost 
forever.  The situation occurring on the California coast is no different.  If not 
considered one already, it will soon be an emergencynot only in terms of 
potential damage to property and infrastructure, but to the state’s 
vulnerable coastline.  If we allow panicked construction of seawalls all along 
92. Id. at 429.
93. Id. at 424.
94. Id. at 424-25.
95. Id. at 445.
96. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 33 Cal 3d at 446-47.
97. Id. at 447.
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the coast, we will drown our beaches and destroy the complex ecosystem 
that makes the California coast such a treasure.   
Audubon shows “that water ‘rights’ are not property, but a kind of 
revocable, usufruct privilege that [are] and always [have] been subject to 
government redefinition to reflect the changing needs of the citizenryto 
reflect changing notions of progress.”98  Rights in coastal Public Trust lands 
are also revocable, usufruct privileges.  Such rights exist only so far as they 
do not interfere with the public’s right to enjoy those lands in their natural 
state.  And just as the government’s sense of changing public needs has 
resulted in redefining the water rights system, changing needs and 
environmental circumstances are grounds for redefining the traditional 
notion of property rights along the California coast. 
2. Joslin v. Marin Municipal Water District
In Joslin v. Marin Municipal Water District,99 the Joslins sued the Marin 
Water District for building a dam upstream of their property that diminished 
the flow of the stream that ran through the Joslins’ riparian lot.100  The Joslins 
were in the business of selling rock and gravel deposited on their land by the 
stream, and the construction of the dam restricted the stream’s flow so as to 
damage the Joslins’ business and decrease the value of their land.101  The 
issue before the court in this case was whether or not Marin Municipal was 
liable to the Joslins for appropriating water upstream of the Joslins’ riparian 
property and thereby limiting the Joslins’ exercise of their riparian rights.102 
The court’s analysis of the Joslins’ claim in this case revolves around 
the California water law principles of reasonable and beneficial 
usedoctrines beyond the scope of this paper.  However, quite relevant 
here is the court’s holding that “[w]hile plaintiffs correctly argue that a 
property right cannot be taken or damaged without just compensation, they 
ignore the necessity of first establishing the legal existence of a 
compensable property interest.”103  The court explained that a property right 
in water is dependent on the use of water conforming to principles of 
reasonable and beneficial use, and that where, as in this case, a use is 
unreasonable, there is no protectable right.104  The court established “that 
since there was and is no property right in an unreasonable use, there has 
been no taking or damaging of property by the deprivation of such use and, 
98. Takacs, supra note 6, at 762.
99. 67 Cal. 2d 132 (1967).
100. Id. at 134.
101. Id. at 134-35.
102. Id. at 136.
103. Id. at 143.
104. Id. at 144.
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accordingly, the deprivation is not compensable.”105  Because in this case the 
Joslins’ use of water was unreasonable, they did not hold a protectable 
interest in that use of the water running through their lot, and therefore 
Marin’s appropriation of that water was not an unconstitutional taking 
against the Joslins.106 
The court’s logic in finding for Marin Municipal is applicable to the 
issue of whether littoral property owners in California have a right to build 
seawalls in violation of the Public Trust Doctrine.  Just as a riparian property 
owner’s use of water becomes unreasonable in light of more important 
competing uses, a seawall justified by a homeowner’s littoral property rights 
is unreasonable in light of the public’s right to enjoy the state’s beaches 
under the Public Trust.  In other words, because private property rights to 
Trust lands are subordinate to the public’s Trust interests in those lands, a 
landowner does not have free and clear property rights to a littoral lot. 
Therefore, where a littoral landholder does something that violates the 
Public Trust, he no longer can claim a valid property interest that justifies 
the violative action. 
C. Takings Case Law and Why Prohibitions on Coastal
Armoring Are not Unconstitutional Takings
As Joesph Sax wrote in one of his many widely cited articles on the 
Public Trust Doctrine, “[i]t makes economic sense to prevent the 
government from taking the property of an individual owner, but it is 
difficult to understand why the government should be prevented from taking 
property which is owned by the public as a whole.”107  As discussed above, 
where Penn Central recognized that the Fifth Amendment protects individuals 
from alone bearing burdens that should be borne by the general public,108 
such a principle does not apply inverselythe public as a whole cannot be 
held responsible for bearing the burdens of a select few who own vulnerable 
littoral property.  Regardless of the unfortunate losses that private property 
owners face, they cannot be allowed to protect their property at such a high 
cost to the environment, the public, and the public’s right to enjoy Trust 
lands.   
105. Id. at 145.
106. Id. at 145-46.
107. Sax, supra note 13, at 479.
108. Penn Central at 123 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49
(1960)). 
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1. The State’s Authority Under the Public Trust Doctrine
Expands with  Evolving Public Needs
In 1894, the Supreme Court held in Shively v. Bowlby109 that improvement 
by individuals to tidal lands is subordinate to public rights, and that the 
rights of littoral owners to their properties are subject to the authority of the 
government to protect Public Trust lands.110  California reinforced the Shively 
holding in Marks v. Whitney.111  There the court held that an owner of Tomales 
Bay tidal property had no right to violate the Public Trust by developing that 
property.112  The Marks court wrote that one of the most important Trust uses 
is preservation of tidelands in their natural state, serving as ecological units 
for study, open space, habitat for wildlife, and as contributing to the 
aesthetics and climate of an area.113  The court further held that Public Trust 
uses are “sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public needs,”114 and 
that the State’s authority to regulate tidelands is absolute so long as the 
State acts within the terms of the Public Trust.115 
The Shively and Marks opinions establish that the State’s authority to 
regulate private property rights expands as the need to regulate expands. 
Perhaps 50 years ago the State would not have had the occasion to prohibit 
a landowner from building a seawall to reinforce a landowner’s beachfront 
lotthough the State would have had then, as it does now, the power to 
restrict that action.  But today, in the face of global warming and imminent 
sea level rise, the State’s ability to prohibit the construction of such seawalls 
is necessary, and justified on the basis of not only the common law Public 
Trust Doctrine, but also the Coastal Act and the Article X, section 4 of the 
California Constitution.  Because littoral landowners have been and are on 
notice that their rights to Public Trust lands are subject to limitation, those 
property owners cannot successfully make takings claims against the State’s 
exercise of its power to limit those coastal property rights. 
2. The Potential Benefits of Protecting Existing Coastal
Development Must Be Weighed Against the Adverse
Effects on the Natural Environment and Public Access
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission is one of the textbook California 
takings cases.  As mentioned in the takings section above, the case involved 
109. 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
110. Id. at 57-58.
111. 6 Cal. 3d 251 (1971).
112. Id. at 261.
113. Id. at 259-60.
114. Id. at 259.
115. Id. at 261.
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the Coastal Commission’s grant of a building permit conditioned on 
Nollan’s agreement to a public easement across his property to allow for 
beach access.116  The Coastal Commission defended the permit condition on 
the grounds that Nollan’s construction of a new house would create a wall of 
houses that would prevent the public from realizing the existence of a public 
beach beyond.117  The Supreme Court found the condition was an 
unconstitutional taking because there was not a sufficient nexus between 
the required easement and preventing a visual barrier to the beach.118   
While the Nollan Court’s substantial nexus test remains good law, 
Justice Brennan’s dissent presents a very compelling argument for why the 
Coastal Commission’s action in the case was in fact not a taking.  Brennan 
contends that the (federal) Coastal Zone Management Act and the Public 
Trust bind the Coastal Commission to ensure public access to the state’s 
beaches.119  In this case, the Commission’s imposition of the easement on 
Nollan’s building permit was the manifestation of the agency’s effort to 
exercise its duties flexibly, and to find balance between public and private 
interests.120  Brennan also points to Article X, section 4 of the California 
Constitution in arguing that the Commission has a duty to condition 
coastline development on provisions that protect public coastal access.121  
Finally, Brennan reminds us that California coastal development has been 
strictly regulated since the passage of the Coastal Act, and that littoral 
owners are on notice that development will be sanctioned only so long as it 
does not impede public beach access.122  
Brennan’s Nollan dissent reads like a general coastal development 
balancing test.  While private property rights exist, they must be exercised in 
accordance with the principles espoused by the Coastal Act, the California 
Constitution, and the Public Trust Doctrine.  Those principles require the 
State to act in furtherance of environmental protection and the people’s 
right to use and enjoy Trust lands.  In considering development permits, the 
State should weigh the applicant’s property rights and the impact of the 
proposed project with the effects that the development will have on the 
coastal ecosystem and the public’s right and ability to access and make use 
of that coastal land.  This opinion serves as further evidence of the fact that 
littoral property rights are usufructuary and cannot be exercised in a 
vacuum.  A property owner can exercise his right to develop his beachfront 
116. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, at 828 (1987).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 838-39.
119. Id. at 846-47.
120. Id. at 847.
121. Id. at 857-58.
122. Id. at 859-60.
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lot only where that right is not outweighed by the adverse impact of the 
development on Public Trust lands and the general public’s interests in 
those lands.   
VI. State Regulation of Coastal Property Rights to Protect
Public Trust Interests in the Shoreline is Not an
Unconstitutional Taking
Penn Central, Lucas, Nollan, and Dolan established that an
unconstitutional regulatory taking occurs when a state regulation is not in 
furtherance of the public interest and entirely deprives land of its economic 
value, and where conditions placed on land use permits are not 
substantially related and roughly proportional to the goals sought to be 
achieved by the conditions.  The caveat to the traditional understanding of 
takings doctrine is that the Public Trust, a doctrine that has been recognized 
and applied since long before the U.S. Constitution was written, prevents 
owners of Public Trust lands from ever obtaining property rights that are free 
and clear of State regulation and limitation.  So while a regulation 
prohibiting a littoral landowner from arming their property against sea level 
rise could possibly result in a total loss of economic value under Lucas, the 
availability of such a claim is limited by California’s codification of the 
Public Trust.   
As detailed previously, Penn Central’s ad-hoc takings analysis of 
whether a regulation has deprived an owner of economically viable use of 
their property includes considering whether or not a landowner’s 
investment-backed expectations have been foiled.  But as Takacs explains in 
his consideration of Penn Central, “[t]he Public Trust Doctrine supports the 
notion that ‘private’ ‘property’ ‘owners’ ‘investment-backed expectations’ 
should always include the idea that certain resources are and always have 
been within the public’s provenance.”123  More broadly, private property 
rights and landowners’ expectations are limited by the Public Trust provision 
that property rights in Trust lands are, and always have been, limited by 
Trust principles.  Therefore, a State limitation on a landowner’s exercise of 
property rights that conflicts with the State’s duty to uphold the Public Trust 
is not a taking because private property rights in Trust lands extend only as 
far as they do not conflict with the Public Trust. 
More particularly, because the construction of seawalls on and to 
protect private lots destroys and blocks public access to California’s 
beaches, such an exercise is violative of the Public Trust; and therefore can 
be prohibited by the State within the bounds of its authority under not only 
the Public Trust Doctrine itself, but the Coastal Act’s codification of that 
doctrine.  Sax illustrates this point in his reference to a California Attorney 
General Opinion: “[t]he owner of lands subject to the public trust may use 
123. Takacs, supra note 6, at 762.
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the property as he sees fit, subject to the power of the State to abate 
(prevent or remove) any nuisance or illegal obstruction he may create 
thereon, and to reoccupy the lands in the event such occupation becomes 
necessary for trust purposes.”124  The Attorney General Opinion Sax 
mentions further reinforces the point made here: that private rights simply 
do not exist beyond the scope of the Public Trust Doctrine; and where a 
landowner acts so as to encroach on Trust interests, the State has the 
authority, and is obligated by the Coastal Act, to push back against the 
private action in protection of Trust lands. 
VII. Conclusion
As the mean high tide linewhich generally separates privately held
coastal land from public landmoves inland with rising sea levels, private 
property owners will want to armor the coastline along their lots in order to 
protect their beachfront homes.  On as large a scale as would be necessary 
to protect all of California’s coastal development, such seawalls would 
drown beaches, destroy tidal ecosystems, and violate the Public Trust 
Doctrine.  While a policy of forbidding coastal armoring to protect private 
property is not without its adverse effects, allowing such widespread 
armoringat the cost of destroying the shorelines and beaches that the 
Public Trust exists to protectis an unacceptable alternative.   
As established by cases such as National Audubon Society and Marks v. 
Whitney, preserving a natural asset so as to allow the public to enjoy 
ecosystems in their natural state is a valid protectable use under the Public 
Trust Doctrine.  Furthermore, among others, these cases recognize that 
protectable Public Trust uses change with evolving public needs and that 
the State’s authority to act in furtherance of the Public Trust is absolute. 
The articles and cases explored in this paper, and the codification of the 
Public Trust in California by Article X, section 4 and the Coastal Act, 
demonstrate that owners of coastal property only have property rights 
insofar as those rights do not run afoul of the Public Trust.  Construction of 
seawalls that not only block public access to beaches, but drown and 
destroy those beaches, are clear violations of the modern understanding of 
the Public Trust Doctrine in California.  Therefore, the State can prohibit 
coastal armoring where it is adverse to Trust interests.  
124. Sax, supra note 13, at 529 (FN 177).
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